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MORE CONNECTION, LESS PROTECTION?
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH WITH ON-CAMPUS IMPACT
Benjamin L. Ellison*
INTRODUCTION
The same scenarios come up time and time again in student free
speech cases. A student spreads rumors about fellow students on his
own website. School authorities find out about the website and inter-
vene.' A group of students publishes an "underground" newspaper
and distributes it on campus. School authorities see the newspaper
and suspend the student.2 A student creates a website threatening or
mocking the school principal. Word spreads, the principal finds out,
and he suspends the student.3 A student writes a disturbing poem. It
makes its way to school and authorities suspend the student for fear of
violence.4 Sometimes courts uphold the suspensions. Other times,
courts hold that schools have impermissibly trampled on student free
speech rights.
The cases all involve student speech that originates off campus,
but then finds its way to campus either through technology, word of
mouth, or a third party. While the Supreme Court has set out rela-
tively clear guidelines to govern student free speech on public school
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., Economics,
University of Notre Dame, 2005. The author would like to thank his parents for their
love and support, and Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom for her help and invaluable
suggestions.
1 See Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-801 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (overturning punishment for student posting website containing profanity and
disparaging remarks about classmates).
2 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1979) (overturn-
ing punishment for students who distributed underground newspaper off campus).
3 See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(overturning suspension of student for creating parody MySpace profile of principal).
4 See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 625 (8th Cir. 2002)
(upholding suspension of student for poem written stating his desire to sodomize and
kill ex-girlfriend); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2001)
(upholding suspension of student for poem describing school shooting).
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campuses, uncertainty about that precedent's applicability to these
scenarios has caused confusion.
School administrators are caught in the middle.5 They are
charged with ensuring order and discipline, inculcating values, and
protecting the safety and welfare of children. Yet, schools must also
refrain from infringing on the free speech rights of students-rights
that the students famously do not shed at the schoolhouse gate. 6 As if
that task were not difficult enough already, the rapid change of tech-
nology that allows students to communicate instantly, on and off cam-
pus, has compounded the problem. The rapid change in
communication technology did not simply plateau with the advent of
the Internet and email. Rather, in recent years the forms of electronic
communication have multiplied, with instant messaging, text messag-
ing, MySpace, Facebook, blogs, YouTube, Twitter, and many more
technologies.7 These allow students to reach each other more and
5 See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash.
2000) ("The defendant argues, persuasively, that school administrators are in an
acutely difficult position after recent school shootings in Colorado, Oregon, and
other places."); Kenneth R. Pike, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by
RepairingJudicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008 BYU
L. REv. 971, 995 n.138 (noting the "legal Scylla and Charybdis that school administra-
tors often face").
6 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
7 Some explanation may be in order for those that are less technology profi-
cient. Instant messaging is a technology through which computer users send instanta-
neous text messages to each other, often using a program such as AOL Instant
Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, or Google Talk. The messages appear on screen, one
after another, reading much like a transcript of a conversation. See Webopedia, What
is Instant Messaging?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/instant-messaging.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
Text messaging allows cell phone users to send short text messages to each other.
See Verizon Wireless, Answers to FAQs, http://support.vzw.com/faqs/TXT%20mes-
saging/faq.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
MySpace is a social networking service through which users can maintain their
own webpages, featuring messages posted to others, music, photos, and more. See
MySpace, Quick Tour, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=userTour.
home (last visited Nov. 20, 2009). Facebook is similar to MySpace, but it also allows
users to create groups around a certain theme and become friends of each other,
linking to other users' web pages via photos or messages. See Facebook, http://
www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
Blog, short for "web log," is a journal that a user posts online, allowing others to
view the entries. Webopedia, What is Blog?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/
blog.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
YouTube is the ubiquitous video sharing website through which users can upload
and view homemade videos. See About.com, Web Trends: What is YouTube?, http://
webtrends.about.com/od/profi3/p/what-is-youtube.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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more. They also multiply the number of ways that students can bully,
harass, taunt, and slander each other.8 Cyberbullying-bullying
through websites, email, and other forms of electronic communica-
tion-has become a widespread problem, with as many as seventy-five
percent of teenage students reporting having been bullied online.9
Teachers and administrators have become targets as well.10 While
some of these forms of student expression may originate off campus,
they can eventually have a great impact on the campus environment,
sometimes without ever being accessed from school. The disruption
caused by such students can wreak havoc on individuals at school"
and the entire school environment, as though the words were uttered
in the classroom. Yet schools are commanded to deal with such dis-
ruptive students in an appropriate way, even when those students
decline to act appropriately themselves.
On the other hand, school administrators have been known to
overreach and overreact to squelch undesirable student speech, often
infringing on student free speech rights.12 In a post-Columbine
Twitter is another social networking tool whereby users update their status with
short text messages indicating their current activities. "Followers" on Twitter sub-
scribe to another person's feed, following the updates as they are posted. See Twitter,
About Twitter, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
8 Tara Parker-Pope, Parents Often Unaware of Cyber-Bullying, N.Y. TIMES WELL
BLOG, Oct. 3, 2008, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/parents-often-una-
ware-of-cyber-bullying/ (noting the diverse online media through which students can
cyberbully). For a cautionary tale on some of the other dangers of such communica-
tion technologies besides cyberbullying, see Charlie Sorrel, Girl Falls into Manhole
While Texting, Parents Sue, WIRED, July 13, 2009, http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/
2009/07/girl-falls-into-manhole-while-texting-parents-sue.
9 Id. Cyberbullying can begin even before the teenage years. See, e.g.,Julie Blair,
New Breed of Bullies Torment Their Peers on the Internet, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 5, 2003, at 6
(noting that children as young as eleven can experience cyberbullying). The phe-
nomenon is also skewed towards girls, who are twice as likely to be cyberbullied as
their male counterparts. Id.
10 See, e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002)
(upholding suspension of student for website that solicited donations to hire a hit
man to have a teacher killed); see also Zaz Hollander, Abusive MySpace Page Draws Law-
suit, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 2009, at Al (noting a lawsuit filed by a principal
for a defamatory MySpace parody of her).
11 See, e.g., Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 852 (noting that the teacher threatened by the
website suffered emotional distress and was forced to take a medical leave of
absence).
12 Cf Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of School
Discipline of Student Cyberspeech, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 727, 729
(2007) ("Academic sanctions and disciplinary punishments doled out by overzealous
or misinformed administrators are often overturned or settled months or years later,
after significant damage has been done.").
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world, schools are especially sensitive to possible threats to student
safety.13 While the Internet may offer students a new outlet for
expression, with the potential to reach wide audiences, it is also a
place where school administrators may seek out and punish what they
find to be inappropriate behavior. In the 1960s, overreaching by
administrators was a threat to student expression via "underground
newspapers."1 4 Now it has become a threat to all student expression
via electronic media.' 5
When students are outside of school, they are normally governed
by the general laws that govern citizens of all ages.16 This includes
speech. When students choose to express themselves in school, how-
ever, their rights are slightly circumscribed, governed by the familiar
Supreme Court trilogy of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,17 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,'18 and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,'9 as well as the newest addition, Morse v.
Frederick.20 These cases establish that a student's constitutional right
to freedom of expression gives way to the school's interests in educa-
tion, order, and discipline if the expression is substantially disruptive,
plainly offensive, perceived to be school sponsored expression, or
understood to advocate illegal drug use.
It is an open question, though, as to what protections this type of
student speech-speech of off-campus origin that reaches campus
somehow-should receive. The student speech trilogy only addresses
student speech that takes place squarely within the school environ-
13 See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626 n.4 (8th Cir.
2002) ("We find it untenable in the wake of Columbine and Jonesboro that any rea-
sonable school official who came into possession of [a student's threatening letter]
would not have taken some action based on its violent and disturbing content."); Clay
Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet
Underground, 7 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 243, 282 (2001) (attributing the overreaction of
school administrators to the slightest threat as "post-Columbine jitters").
14 See Thomas E. Wheeler, Lessons from the Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of
Schools to Protect Students from Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 EDUc. L. REP.
227, 231 (2007); cf Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1341
(S.D. Tex. 1969) ("So called 'underground' newspapers have sprung up in high
schools all over the United States during the past year.").
15 Professor Clay Calvert has advocated that schools remember the "safety valve"
function of speech, allowing students to vent their frustrations, perhaps preventing
the sort of school violence seen at Columbine. See Calvert, supra note 13, at 282-85.
16 Sullivan, 307 F. Supp. at 1340-41.
17 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
18 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
19 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
20 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
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ment.2 1 Thus, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
question of what protections the Constitution gives to student speech
that originates off campus but eventually reaches campus or has an
impact there.
Commentators almost universally decry the disarray in the lower
courts on this issue. Indeed, there is some confusion. All seem to
agree that there is some room for schools to discipline students for
speech that originates off campus when there is a sufficient connec-
tion to the school campus. But what constitutes a sufficient connec-
tion? Is it enough if the student speaker directs his speech to campus
in some way? If he reasonably should have known that his speech
would reach campus? If a third party brings the speech to campus?
Commentators are divided into two camps on the issue: one, con-
cerned with overzealous school officials violating student free speech
rights; the other, concerned with the epidemic of cyberbullying. The
cases involve compelling stories that fuel the fires of both camps.22 In
light of the disarray in lower courts, commentators have also sug-
gested various tests to deal with the issue, ranging from the simple, to
the intuitive, to the exotic.
This Note attempts to resolve this issue of off-campus speech pro-
tection in public schools. Part I looks at the Supreme Court's student
speech cases. Part II surveys how the lower courts have handled
school regulation of off-campus student speech. Results and method-
ology differ. Part III examines and critiques various proposed tests for
how to treat off-campus student speech. It then suggests a test in
which protected off-campus speech would only be subject to school
discipline if the speaker intends for the speech to reach campus, and
the speech actually does reach campus, with some exceptions.
21 See Calvert, supra note 13, at 269-70. Even the recent case of Morse v. Frederick,
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), was decided within the school context, even though the
speech was technically off campus (though under school supervision). See infta Part
I.D.
22 One of the most high-profile cyberbullying cases actually occurred outside of
school. Lori Drew, a fifty-year-old mother, created a fake MySpace account, posing as
a teenage boy, and befriended Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl. Jennifer Stein-
hauer, Woman Who Posed as Boy Testifies in Case that Ended in Suicide of 13-Year-Old, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2008, at A18. Drew became increasingly disparaging of Meier, eventu-
ally telling her that the world would be better without her. Id. Distraught, Meier
hanged herself. Id. State prosecutors were unable to charge Drew with anything, and
her jury conviction on federal fraud charges was overturned. Alexandra Zavis, Web
Hoax Conviction Tossed, CHI. TIuB., July 3, 2009, at 15. Congress responded by intro-
ducing a federal anti-cyberbullying law, see Cyber-Bullying and the Courts: Megan's Law,
EcoNoMiST, July 11, 2009, at 32.
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I. STUDENT SPEECH PROTECTIONS
Speech, in general, is divided into two categories: protected and
unprotected. Protected speech receives full First Amendment protec-
tion.23 Unprotected speech includes certain categories that govern-
ments can regulate, free from the normal restraints. Such categories
include fighting words,24 true threats, 25 incitement,26 and obscenity.27
Such speech is unprotected because courts have deemed it to be with-
out value, not advancing political discussion, unnecessary in form to
communicate ideas, or a combination of these.28 Unprotected speech
is punishable by schools on campus, just as it is subject to punishment
in the rest of the world. The line of Supreme Court cases addressing
student speech- Tinker and its progeny-apply to the realm of other-
wise protected speech in the school context. This Note will refer to
the types of speech identified by the Tinker line of cases that receive
less protection in the school environment as "less-protected speech."
A. Tinker
The student speech trilogy begins in the 1960s with Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.29 A group of high school
and middle school students chose to wear black armbands to school to
protest the Vietnam War.30 School authorities had learned about the
plan earlier and enacted a policy banning all armbands from school
under pain of suspension.31 The students wore the armbands anyway
23 The First Amendment states, in part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
24 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (classify-
ing speech directed at another and likely to provoke a violent response as
unprotected).
25 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (noting
that "[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence"); Watts v. United States, 394
U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that true threats are not constitutionally
protected speech).
26 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (clas-
sifying speech that incites imminent lawless action as unprotected).
27 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that "obscen-
ity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
28 See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 ("It has been well observed that such utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
29 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
30 Id. at 504.
31 Id.
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and the school suspended them under the policy.3 2 The students
brought a civil action against the school authorities for violating their
First Amendment rights.3 3 The district court upheld the authorities'
actions as reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school disci-
pline.3 4 The Eighth Circuit, hearing the case en banc, was evenly
divided and thus affirmed the lower court's decision without
opinion.3 5
The Supreme Court began by explaining, "It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."3 6 None-
theless, "the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, con-
sistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools."3 7 Unlike previous cases involving dis-
ruptive demonstrations or dress codes regulating hair length, the
Court characterized the present case as involving "pure speech."3 8
Accordingly, the Court pronounced the rule regarding the regu-
lation of speech on school campuses:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohi-
bition cannot be sustained.3 9
The school could not rely on "undifferentiated fear or apprehen-
sion of disturbance" to justify its actions. 4 0 Nor could school officials
suppress speech simply because they disagreed with the message. 4 1
Later in the opinion, the Court indicated that actual "material and
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 505.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 506. But see Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas,J.,
dissenting) ("In my view, the history of public education suggests that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech in public
schools.").
37 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
38 Id. at 508.
39 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
40 Id. at 508.
41 Id. at 511.
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substantial interference" was not required, but that a reasonable fore-
cast of such disturbance could justify action by the school authori-
ties.4 2 Outside of this "substantial interference" standard, the Court
reassured students that they retained broad freedoms of speech in
school: "In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views."43
Finding neither an actual "material and substantial interference,"
nor a reasonable forecast of such disturbance, the Court held that the
school's actions violated the students' First Amendment rights. 44
B. Fraser
"'I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants.'" 4 5 So began
Matthew Fraser's speech, nominating a classmate for a student elected
office at an assembly, attended by six hundred of his classmates. The
speech went on, in an elaborate, graphic sexual metaphor, despite
earlier warnings from two teachers not to deliver the speech. 46 Mat-
thew was suspended and his name was removed from the list of stu-
dents participating in graduation exercises. 47 Matthew was disciplined
for violating a school rule prohibiting "[c]onduct which materially
and substantially interferes with the educational process . .. including
the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."48
The Court began by explaining that despite Tinker, the schools
remained a place where order, discipline, and inculcation of values
must be allowed. The Court stated: "' [P] ublic education must pre-
42 See id. at 511, 514.
43 Id. at 511.
44 Id. at 514.
45 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quotingJoint Appendix at 47, Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (No.
84-1667).
46 Id. at 677-78 (majority opinion). The entire speech was as follows:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of
Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.
If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack
things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he suc-
ceeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each
and every one of you. So vote forJeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never
come between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Joint Appendix at 47, Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (No. 84-1667)).
47 Id. at 678 (majority opinion).
48 Id.
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pare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in
the community and the nation."' 49 While inculcating such fundamen-
tal values, a school "must also take into account consideration of the
sensibilities of others, and . .. the sensibilities of fellow students....
Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society
requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other par-
ticipants and audiences."50 The Court continued: "The schools, as
instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of
civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged
in by this confused boy."15 The Court noted the offense that many
students, especially girls, probably took to the speech, and the bewil-
derment from some of the younger listeners.5 2 The Court cited other
examples in which standards of decency allowed more freedom for
adults than for younger audiences.5 3
Thus, Fraser created another facet to permissible school speech
regulation. Without needing to prove the substantial disruption
required by Tinker, schools may regulate student speech that is
"plainly offensive"5 4 or "offensively lewd and indecent."55
C. Hazelwood
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier concerns only speech that
may be construed by an audience to be school sponsored. The stu-
dents involved were in a high school journalism class and were in
49 Id. at 681 (alteration in original) (quoting CHARLES AuSTIN BEARD & MARY RIT-
TER BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 683.
52 See id. at 683-84 (noting that some in the audience were "only fourteen-years-
old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality").
53 Id. at 684 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978)). In Pacifica
Foundation, the Court held that FCC regulation of "indecent but not obscene" radio
broadcast was constitutional, partly because broadcast would likely be heard by chil-
dren. Id. at 729, 748. Cf Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 64-45 (1968) (finding
ban on sale of sexually oriented material to minors was constitutional, even though
material was protected by First Amendment with respect to adults).
54 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. For some reason, subsequent cases in the lower courts
have latched on to the "plainly offensive" standard as the key words from Fraser. But
those words are used to describe the crowd's reaction to the speech. Instead, the
more explicit holding seems to refer to "offensively lewd and indecent speech." See id.
at 685.
55 Id.
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charge of publishing the school newspaper.56 The students were
under the supervision of a teacher; the paper was funded entirely by
the school.57 For one particular issue, the principal decided to excise
two pages from the paper just before publication because he believed
that the topics-divorce and teen pregnancy-would be inappropri-
ate for younger students.58 He was also concerned about the privacy
of the students interviewed in the articles, despite the use of false
names.59 The students filed suit, alleging a violation of their freedom
of speech.60
While acknowledging Tinker and Fraser, the Court proceeded to
address the case with a forum-based analysis. The Court held that the
school was not a public forum, that is, neither a traditional place for
speech and dialogue (such as streets, parks, and sidewalks), nor a
forum that the government had opened up to the public for all man-
ner of speech.61 On the contrary, the Court examined the policy and
practice regarding the school newspaper and found that the school
exercised significant control over the newspaper as part of its journal-
ism curriculum. 62 Thus, rather than relinquishing control of the
newspaper, the school "'reserve[d] the forum for its intended
purpos[e],"' that is, as a supervised educational experience in journal-
ism. 63 "The . . . question concerns educators' authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might rea-
sonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 6 4 The Court
held that schools are allowed to regulate speech to make sure that the
lessons they intend to teach are effectively conveyed, the content is
age-appropriate, and the views of a student are not erroneously attrib-
uted to the school. 65 Control over school-sponsored student expres-
sion does not offend the First Amendment "so long as [the school's]
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 66
The Court upheld the school's actions, finding no constitutional
violation.
56 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1987).
57 Id. at 262-63.
58 Id. at 263.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 264.
61 Id. at 267.
62 Id. at 268.
63 Id. at 270 (alterations in original) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
64 Id. at 271.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 273.
818 [VOL. 852
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH WITH ON-CAMPUS IMPACT
D. Morse
When the Olympic torch relay was passing by Juneau-Douglas
High School in Alaska, before a crowd of thousands of students and
other citizens, student Joseph Frederick decided it would be a good
idea to unfurl a fourteen-foot banner bearing the message, "BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS."6 7 The principal confiscated the banner and sus-
pended Frederick.68 The principal's concern was that bystanders
might understand the message-as nonsensical as it was6 9-to be
advocating illegal drug use.70
Although the students were gathered off campus, across the
street from school grounds, the Court approached the issue as a stu-
dent speech issue.7 1 Nonetheless, the Court observed that Tinker was
not the only rule that governed school speech, as noted by Fraser,2
thus leaving some leeway to create a new wrinkle in student speech
jurisprudence. Discussing constitutional rights in general, the Court
stated that precedent established that students' constitutional rights
were limited by the needs of the school context.73 Some of the same
precedent, the Court explained, also emphasized the particular inter-
est that schools have in deterring drug use by students. 74 The Court
cited other evidence regarding the seriousness of the drug problem
among youth.7 5 The Court stated that "[t]he 'special characteristics
of the school environment' and the governmental interest in stopping
student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression
67 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). With the addition of Morse, the Tinker trilogy becomes a tetralogy, from the
Greek prefix tetra- meaning "four."
68 Id. at 2622-23.
69 See id. 2624 (noting that Frederick claimed "'that the words were just nonsense
meant to attract television cameras'" (quoting Morse, 439 F.3d at 1117-18)).
70 Id. at 2623. School board policy prohibited such advocacy. See id. ("The Board
specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that . . . advocates the use of
substances that are illegal to minors .... ).
71 See id. at 2623-24. The Court held that the outing was a school-sponsored
event, and that school personnel were monitoring students. School rules specifically
provided that students in "approved social events and class trips are subject to district
rules for student conduct." Id. at 2624.
72 See id. at 2627. The Court also noted that Hazelwood was inapplicable because
"no one would reasonably believe that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprima-
tur." Id.
73 See id. ("'Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere.'" (quoting Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995))).
74 See id. at 2628 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 661).
75 Id.
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that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use."7 6 The pro-
scription of student speech in this case dealt with a serious danger,
and not merely an unpleasant viewpoint with which the school did not
want to contend.77 The Court held that the principal did not violate
Frederick's constitutional rights.7 8
II. LOWER COURT TREATMENT
Lower courts differ in how they treat off-campus student speech.
While Supreme Court cases have marked the contours of student's
free speech rights in school, it is unclear what it takes to bring speech
originating off campus under the umbrella of less-protected speech in
the school environment. This confusion is not unique to electronic
communication, but it is particularly acute with respect to Internet, a
medium that blurs traditional notions of geographic location.79 Every
lower court that has ruled on the issue has required off-campus stu-
dent expression to have some connection to campus to bring it within
the realm of less-protected speech for school disciplinary purposes.
The strength of the connection that courts require varies. The varia-
tion usually concerns the mental state of the speaker with regard to
the presence of the speech on campus. Some courts require that the
student directed his speech towards campus. Some require only that
the student had knowledge that his speech would reach campus.
Other courts require only that it have been reasonably foreseeable
that the speech would reach campus. Still others look at a multitude
of factors to require a strong nexus between the off-campus speech
and the on-campus impact.
Commentators seem to agree on one thing regarding First
Amendment protections for off-campus speech: the lower courts are
76 Id. at 2629 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
77 Id. The Court rejected, however, the school's contention that Fraser allowed it
to proscribe Frederick's speech because it was "plainly offensive." Id.
78 Justice Alito concurred, writing separately to reiterate his understanding that
the majority's holding
[went] no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that
a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and ...
it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be
interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including speech
on issues such as "the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana
for medicinal use."
Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
79 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (noting that the Internet is
"located in no particular geographical location").
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in a state of total disarray.8 0 However, careful analysis shows that the
courts are only in a state of slight disarray and uncertainty. Courts all
agree that there must be some sort connection between the speech
and the school campus. It is true that, in exercise of judicial pru-
dence, some courts have chosen not to address the issue of on-cam-
pus/off-campus location of speech if it need not be addressed. For
example, if the court can decide a case because the speech did not
amount to a substantial disruption under Tinker anyway, it will do so.
The court can thus dispose of the case without having to decide more
than is necessary.8 1 This does not indicate disarray.82
One might be inclined to think that this entire analysis is point-
less, as schools have no business meddling in student affairs off cam-
pus. Indeed, to the judge in Sullivan v. Houston Independent School
Distict,3 the very notion was preposterous:
In this court's judgment, it makes little sense to extend the influ-
ence of school administration to off-campus activity under the the-
ory that such activity might interfere with the function of education.
School officials may not judge a student's behavior while he is in his
home with his family nor does it seem to this court that they should
have jurisdiction over his acts on a public street corner. A student is
subject to the same criminal laws and owes the same civil duties as
other citizens, and his status as a student should not alter his obliga-
tions to others during his private life away from the campus.8 4
80 See Pike, supra note 5, at 990 ("[W]hen it comes to student cyber-speech, the
lower courts are in complete disarray."); Tracy Adamovich, Note, Return to Sender: Off-
Campus Student Speech Brought On-Campus by Another Student, 82 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 1087,
1095 (2008) (noting the "disarray" and "confusion"); Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom,
Note, State Legislation Mandating School Cyberbullying Policies and the Potential Threat to
Students' Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. L. REv. 283, 302 (2008) ("When lower courts have
applied the Tinker standard to off-campus cyberspeech, they have not uniformly held
that school discipline violates the First Amendment."). But see Wheeler, supra note
14, at 244 ("It seems clear that contrary to the difficulties forecast by some commenta-
tors the [student speech] trilogy has survived the leap into the cyberage and [various
holdings create] a framework for regulating cyberspeech without unnecessarily
restricting either student rights or endangering the educational function of the
schools.").
81 See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456 (W.D. Pa.
2001) (finding a lack of substantial disruption without deciding the location of the
student speech).
82 But cf Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4)ESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public
School Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN.
L. REv. 1206, 1227 (2008) ("To employ the Tinker test to answer the threshold ques-
tion of when cyberspeech is student speech is to use the wrong tool for the wrong
job.").
83 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
84 Id. at 1340-41.
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Nevertheless, schools do generally have the authority to punish
students for off-campus conduct.85 Courts have upheld such punish-
ments for student offenses such as fighting,86 reckless driving,87 intoxi-
cation,88 illegal drugs,89 and fighting words spoken to teachers,90 all
while off campus. In some of these cases, students brought challenges
under the Due Process Clause, each one of them failing. As long as
state law grants the school authorities such power, there remains no
constitutional barrier to school authority reaching off campus.9 1
There is no "limitation on overreaching school authority clause" in
the Constitution.
From the outset, then, it is clear that schools can exercise some
authority over off-campus student conduct. State law notwithstanding,
there are no federal constitutional limits to the authority of schools
over its students while off campus.
But of course there is still the First Amendment. In the speech
context the question becomes what level of protection does off-cam-
pus student speech receive? Is it protected under the standards set
85 See generally Ronald D. Wenkart, Discipline of K-12 Students for Conduct off School
Grounds, 210 EDUC. L. REP. 531, 533-38 (describing cases in which courts upheld
school discipline over off-campus student conduct).
86 See Pollnow v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220, 221 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd 757
F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1985); Nicholas B. v. Sch. Comm., 587 N.E.2d 211, 212 (Mass. 1992).
87 See Clements v. Bd. of Trs., 585 P.2d 197, 204 (Wyo. 1978).
88 See Douglas v. Campbell, 116 S.W. 211, 213 (Ark. 1909). But see Bunger v. Iowa
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 564 (Iowa 1972). In Bunger, the court
invalidated an athletic regulation prohibiting student athletes from riding in a car
they knew contained beer because of a lack of a sufficient nexus to school and
because of the unreasonableness of the rule. Id.
89 See Howard v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 621 A.2d 362, 365-66 (Del. 1992) (uphold-
ing suspension of student for selling cocaine to an undercover officer during summer
break).
90 See Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1976). But see Klein v.
Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986) (holding that connection between a
school and a student "giving the finger" to a teacher off campus, outside of school
hours was too attenuated for the school to suspend the student).
91 See Bush ex rel. Bush v. Dassel-Cokato Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 562, 573 (D.
Minn. 1990) (upholding school punishment for off-campus conduct involving alcohol
where punishment did not exceed statutory authority); Howard, 621 A.2d at 365
(holding that suspension for off-campus drug dealing was within statutory authority
for the school board to "'prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct and manage-
ment of the schools'" (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1049 (1990))). Even when a
state statute limits schools to discipline only while students are under school supervi-
sion, even a small connection to off-campus activity can provide the necessary link for
schools to act. See, e.g., Giles v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 669 A.2d 1079, 1082 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995) (holding a student who arranged sale of drugs while on campus,
to take place off campus, punishable by school).
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forth in the Supreme Court free speech trilogy or is it given the full
protection that speech receives in the rest of the real world?
A. Brought on Campus by the Speaker
The strongest case for a connection to campus seems to exist
when the student speaker brings the off-campus speech to campus
himself. In many ways, this speech is not much different from the
student expressing the very same words on campus, in person. In
LaVine v. Blaine School District,92 James LaVine, a high school student,
was expelled for a poem that he had written at home and brought to
school. The poem, entitled "Last Words," described a school shooting
in which the student kills twenty-eight students and then takes his own
life.9 3 Despite his mother's warnings, James brought it to school and
showed it to several friends and eventually submitted it to his English
teacher for her feedback.94 Upon reading the poem, the teacher
alerted the school counselor about the disturbing content.95 After a
series of discussions and encounters with James by school officials, the
sheriffs department, and his parents, the principal decided to expel
him.96 The court proceeded to analyze James's free speech claim
under the Tinker standard.9 7 The court ultimately upheld the emer-
gency expulsion, finding that the school reasonably predicted a sub-
stantial disruption to the school environment, due to the threatening
nature of his expression." The court never questioned the assump-
tion that the student speech cases controlled in the case before them,
as it was James himself that brought his own speech to school.
Similarly, in Coy v. Board of Education,99 the fact that the student
brought the speech to school himself-albeit electronically-seemed
to supply the necessary connection to school. Jon Coy, a middle
school student, created a website at home that contained insulting
remarks about three of his classmates, as well as other uses of profan-
ity, and "a depressingly high number of spelling and grammatical
errors."100 Jon accessed the website on a school computer during
92 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
93 Id. at 983-84.
94 Id. at 984.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 985-86. After seventeen days, the expulsion was rescinded and James
returned to school. Id. at 986.
97 See id. at 988-92.
98 Id. at 991-92. The court did, however, overturn the issuance of a disciplinary
letter in the student's permanent file. Id.
99 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
100 Id. at 795.
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class time, and the school suspended him.10 The court indicated that
because Jon had brought the website to school, Tinker would apply.102
While ultimately failing to find a disruption of any kind that would
support the punishment under Tinker, 03 the district court nonethe-
less made it clear that the in-school actions of the student-speaker-
accessing the website while in school-would have supplied the neces-
sary connection to school. 10 4
B. Knowledge Supplies the Connection
At least one court has found a connection to campus when the
student had knowledge that the disruptive speech would be distrib-
uted at school. In Boucher v. School Board,105 Justin Boucher, a high
school junior, was suspended for writing an article explaining "'how to
hack the school[']s gay ass computers' that was distributed in an
underground newspaper at school.106 While the newspaper was cre-
ated and printed off campus, it was distributed-perhaps by a third
party-in the bathrooms, lockers, and cafeteria of the school.10 7 "Jus-
tin wrote the article outside the school and it then appeared with his
101 Id. at 796. School administrators had been alerted to the existence of the web-
site the day before. Id. at 795. Jon was later expelled for eighty days. Id. at 796. He
was cited for violating three rules: obscenity, disobedience, and inappropriate action
or behavior. Id. at 795-96. Since the website was not authorized according to the
technology use policy, he could also have been in violation of that rule. Id. at 800.
102 Id. at 799.
103 See id. at 799-801.
104 The court does not even mention the on-campus/off-campus distinction, find-
ing no question that the student's actions constituted expressive activity at school.
The court did characterize the activity as private, silent and passive, thus finding that
Tinker would apply:
Throughout a single class period, Jon Coy occasionally accessed his website
in a manner designed to draw as little attention as possible to what he was
viewing. Tinker's holding that it is only appropriate to regulate "silent, pas-
sive expression of opinion" when the speech would "materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school" is the proper standard for the Court to analyze the
plaintiffs' first claim.
Id. at 800 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09
(1969)).
105 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998).
106 Id. at 822-23 (alterations in original) (quoting The Last, Justin Boucher's
underground newspaper). Justin was suspended for "endanger[ing] school prop-
erty." Id. at 823.
107 Id. at 822. The newspaper, entitled The Last, was distributed for the first time
in April 1997. Justin's article appeared in the June issue. Id.
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knowledge. . . for distribution at school." 08 The court upheld the sus-
pension under Tinker because the school reasonably forecasted that
the article would cause substantial disruption to the school. 109 While
Justin argued that the school's authority over off-campus speech was
less than its authority on school grounds, the court found his argu-
ment inapplicable since the newspaper had actually been distributed
on campus.' 10 "In addition, the district court found that the article
advocates on-campus activity. Thus, on the record before us, it
appears the case law applicable to student expression will apply. . . ."'
Either Justin's knowledge that the article would reach campus, the
article's advocacy of on-campus activity, or both supplied the neces-
sary connection to campus.
C. Reasonable Foreseeability
Reasonable foreseeability is the weakest connection that courts
have found sufficient to establish a connection between off-campus
speech and the school campus. Not all courts have accepted it. In
Wisniewski v. Board ofEducation,112 the court upheld an eighth grader's
semester-long suspension because of his off-campus expression.113
Aaron Wisniewski created an Instant Message icon114 for his account
that depicted a gun shooting the head of a person, with blood splat-
108 Id. at 824 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Without any further clarification, all that can be known is thatjustin knew
the article would be distributed. It might be a fair inference, however, that Justin
submitted the article to the publishers of The Last, intending it to be distributed at
school.
109 Id. at 828. The only disruption the article seems to have caused is the series of
precautionary measures taken by the school: running diagnostics and changing pass-
words. Id. at 827.
110 See id. at 829.
111 Id.
112 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
113 Id. at 35-36.
114 The court explained:
Instant messaging enables a person using a computer with Internet access to
exchange messages in real time with members of a group ["buddies"] who
have the same IM software on their computers. ...
The [America Online] IM program, like many others, permits the
sender of IM messages to display on the computer screen an icon, created by
the sender, which serves as an identifier of the sender, in addition to the
sender's name. The IM icon of the sender and that of the person replying
remain on the screen during the exchange of text messages between the two
"buddies," and each can copy the icon of the other and transmit it to any
other "buddy" during an IM exchange.
Id. at 35-36.
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tering.61 5  Below the image appeared the words "Kill Mr.
VanderMolen"-Aaron's English teacher.116 A few weeks earlier, the
teacher had informed the class that the school would not tolerate
threats, and that they would be treated as acts of violence.' 1 7 While
Aaron did not send his icon to anyone at school, it was visible to any-
one on his buddy list for approximately three weeks." 8
During that time, one of Aaron's classmates noticed the icon
while on his home computer, printed out a copy of it, and brought it
to the attention of the teacher, who in turn submitted it to other
school authorities.119 Aaron never brought the icon to school. The
school took disciplinary action, including an initial five-day suspen-
sion, and then a semester-long suspension, determined by a special
hearing officer and ratified by the school board. 120 Police also
opened a criminal investigation, but abandoned it after the investigat-
ing officer concluded that the student intended the icon as ajoke and
posed no actual threat to VanderMolen or any other official.121
The Second Circuit found that the matter could be resolved
under the Tinker standard because the icon caused substantial disrup-
tion on campus. 122 Thus, the court did not find it necessary to deter-
mine whether or not the icon constituted a true threat under the
Watts v. United States'2 3 standard. 124 Addressing the issue of the loca-
tion of the speech, the court stated, "The fact that Aaron's creation
and transmission of the IM icon occurred away from school property
does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline. We have rec-
ognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of sub-
stantial disruption within a school as have other courts."1 25 The panel
was divided, however, on what was required to hold the student liable
for that disruption-either because it actually reached campus, or
because it was reasonably foreseeable that the icon would reach cam-
115 Id. at 36.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. The officer found that the student had violated New York Education Law
section 3214(3) by "endangering the health and welfare of other students and staff at
the school." Id. The officer further found that the icon should be understood as a
threat and not merely as a joke. Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 38-39.
123 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (articulating the standard for what
amounts to a "true threat" and thus, is unprotected speech).
124 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37.
125 Id. at 39 (footnote omitted),
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pus.1 2 6 The court conveniently resolved the issue by finding that,
either way, the icon did reach school property and it was also reasona-
bly foreseeable that it would do so.12 7
Though other courts have adopted the Wisniewski approach,'12 8
one court has rejected the idea that "reasonable foreseeability" that
off-campus speech would reach campus is enough to subject the origi-
nal speaker to school discipline. In Thomas v. Board of Education of
Granville Central School District,' 29 a group of high school students were
punished for publishing and distributing a "morally offensive, inde-
cent, and obscene" underground newspaper.13 0 The court found that
the school had no authority to punish the students because the
speech was not on-campus speech that would have made it subject to
the Tinker standard.131 The students had carefully prepared, pub-
lished, and distributed the paper off campus, outside of school
hours.13 2 Despite the students' care, a copy of the publication came
to the attention of school administrators when they seized it from
another student.13 3 The court stated, "[O]ur willingness to defer to
the schoolmaster's expertise in administering school discipline rests,
in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does
not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate." 3 4 Furthermore, the court
expressly rejected the idea that off-campus speech became on-campus
speech if it was merely foreseeable to the student that the speech
would reach campus, stating, "[W]e believe that this power is denied
to public school officials when they seek to punish off-campus expres-
sion simply because they reasonably foresee that in-school distribution
may result." 35
126 See id. at 39.
127 See id. at 39-40.
128 See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 216-17 (D. Conn. 2007)
(citing Wisniewski, holding that student could be punished for blog posting that was
reasonably foreseeable to be viewed by students).
129 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
130 Id. at 1046. The newspaper, entitled Hard Times styled itself after the National
Lampoon, a "well-known publication specializing in sexual satire." Id. at 1045. The
offensive content included articles lambasting "school lunches, cheerleaders, class-
mates, and teachers," as well as articles on masturbation and prostitution. Id.
131 See id. at 1044-45.
132 Id. at 1045. The court found that a de minimis part of the paper was prepared
on campus. Id. at 1050.
133 Id. at 1045-46.
134 Id. at 1044-45. The court also stated that outside the school campus, school
officials would be bound by the same First Amendment restrictions that normally
apply to all government actors. Id.
135 See id. at 1053 n.18. But see Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d
Cir. 2007) (holding that foreseeability was enough).
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D. On-Campus Presence Through a Third Party Alone is Insufficient
Courts have almost universally held that the fact that speech
reaches campus via a third party is not enough, without more, to cre-
ate a sufficient connection to campus. In Porter v. Ascension Parish
School Board,'3 6 the Fifth Circuit ruled on just such a case. Adam
Porter, then age fourteen, drew a picture showing a "siege" of his
school, involving a gasoline truck, missile launchers, and helicopter,
as well as racial epithets, profanity, and a brick being thrown at the
head of a principal.' 3 7 The drawing remained in a notebook that he
stored in a closet at his home until two years later, when his younger
brother, Andrew, brought the notebook to school, came across the
drawing, and brought it to the school bus driver. 1 3 8 The high school
suspended Adam and advised him that he would likely lose in an
expulsion hearing.'3 9 Adam waived his right to an expulsion hearing
and preemptively transferred to an alternative school.140
While recognizing that other cases gave schools the authority to
punish off-campus speech that was later brought on campus or
directed at campus,1 4 1 the court nonetheless held that the facts of this
case-that the speech remained off campus for two years and that it
was inadvertently brought on campus by a third party-took the case
"out of the scope of [those] precedents." 142 Because of the uninten-
tional manner in which the notebook reached campus, the court held
that the Tinker standard of "substantial disruption" did not apply to
the speech.' 4 3  Other courts have agreed that mere presence of
136 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
137 See id. at 611.
138 Id. Andrew had drawn a picture of a llama in the sketchpad and wanted to
show it to others. Id.
139 Id. at 611-12.
140 Id. at 612.
141 See id. at 615 n.22 (citing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th
Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1998); Sullivan v.
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1075-77 (5th Cir. 1973); Killion v. Franklin
Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001)).
142 See id.
143 Id. at 615. Neither did the speech constitute a true threat. See id. at 618. Nev-
ertheless, the court found an issue of material fact as to whether the speech was the
impetus behind his punishment. Id. at 618. The court also found that the principal
was entitled to qualified immunity on the claim, specifically because the standards for
determining if off-campus speech brought on campus is punishable were unclear. Id.
at 621.
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speech on-campus, due to a third party, is insufficient to connect the
otherwise off-campus speech to the school campus. 144
E. Finding a Multifactor Nexus
Some courts choose to analyze the connection between off-cam-
pus speech and on-campus impact with a multifactor analysis, rather
than relying solely on the mental state of the student-speaker. In JS.
v. Bethlehem Area School District,145 the court upheld the suspension of
an eighth grade student for a website he created that ridiculed teach-
ers and administrators. 146 J.S. created the website from his home
computer and titled it "Teacher Sux."' 47 The website made deroga-
tory, profane, and offensive comments about J.S.'s algebra teacher
and principal, listing reasons why the teacher should die, and solicit-
ing donations to pay for a hitman to kill her.'4 8 J.S. told other stu-
dents about the website and even showed it to students on a school
computer.' 49 News of the website spread throughout the school.
Soon, the principal learned of the website, investigated it, alerted the
FBI, and informed the algebra teacher targeted by the website.150 The
teacher suffered severe distress, and was not able to return to teaching
that year or the next.' 5 i Eventually, the school expelled J.S.15 2
144 See, e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 975 (5th Cir. 1972)
(finding that an underground newspaper distributed off campus was not subject to
school discipline, even though other students brought the paper into school). How-
ever, the court was not willing to entirely foreclose the possibility of subjecting off-
campus conduct to school discipline. See id. at 974. ("Although the students urge the
argument, we do not feel it necessary to hold that any attempt by a school district to
regulate conduct that takes place off the school ground and outside school hours can
never pass constitutional muster.").
145 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
146 Id. at 869.
147 Id. at 850-51.
148 Id. at 850-52. The website claimed that the principal was having sexual rela-
tions with the principal at another school. Id. The website was even more brutal to
the algebra teacher, as it made derogatory and profane remarks about her, ridiculed
her physical appearance and disposition, and compared her to Adolf Hitler. Id.
Finally, the reasons why the teacher should die were accompanied by a small drawing
of the teacher, decapitated, with blood dripping from her neck. Id.
149 Id. at 851-52.
150 Id. at 852.
151 Id. Worrying that someone wanted to kill her, her symptoms included stress,
anxiety, loss of sleep, and other consequences requiring medication. Id. She
received medical leave for the following year. Id.
152 Id. at 853. About a week after the administration discovered the website, J.S.
took it down on his own accord, having not yet been confronted about the website.
Id. at 852.
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The court began by stating, "First, a threshold issue regarding the
'location' of the speech must be resolved to determine if the unique
concerns regarding the school environment are even implicated [in
order to apply Tinher], i.e., is it on campus speech or purely off-cam-
pus speech?"'5 3 The court rejected J.S.'s claim that the speech was
"purely off-campus speech, which would arguably be subject to some
higher level of First Amendment protection."15 4 The court found a
"sufficient nexus between the [website] and the school campus," not-
ingJ.S.'s efforts to access the website in school and show it to others,
his targeting of the website to his fellow members of the school com-
munity as the intended audience, and the fact that the school admin-
istrators learned of it. 155 The court concluded, "[W]here speech that
is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the
school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will
be considered on-campus speech." 156 The connection to campus thus
being established, the court also found that the website caused a sub-
stantial disruption and upheld the suspension. 15 7
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District,15 8 the court did not find a
sufficient nexus to connect the student's off-campus speech to cam-
pus. The student created a parody MySpace profile of the school prin-
cipal, mocking him with accusations of alcohol abuse and sexual
behavior.159 While the student originally created the profile off cam-
pus, he accessed it several times from school and showed it to others
while at school.1 60 A teacher also found other students accessing the
website and giggling about it while in the computer lab.16 1 Several
other teachers reported students discussing the profile in class, and
eventually an administrative meeting was called.16 2 The school lim-
ited computer access for several days, finally barring access to MyS-
153 Id. at 864.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 865.
156 Id. The court also noted that "[a]lthough not before our court, we do not rule
out a holding that purely off-campus speech may nevertheless be subject to regulation
or punishment by a school district if the dictates of Tinker are satisfied." Id. at 864
n.11.
157 Id. at 869. The teacher targeted by the website later succeeded in a suit against
J.S., securing a $500,000 judgment against him for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy. See Kathryn Balint, Personal Fouls: Students Get Rude
and Crude with Internet Slambooks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRus., Nov. 3, 2001, at El.
158 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
159 Id. at 590-91.
160 Id. at 591-93.
161 Id. at 592.
162 Id. at 593.
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pace entirely.16 3 The court noted that unlike traditional school
speech cases, "in cases involving off-campus speech, such as this one,
the school must demonstrate an appropriate nexus" in order to pun-
ish speech in the Tinker context.1 6 4 The court found that several fac-
tors necessitated finding that no sufficient nexus existed:
[T] he School District is unable to connect the alleged disruption to
Justin's conduct insofar as there were three other profiles of [the
principal] that were available on myspace.com during the same
timeframe [sic]. Moreover, the School has not demonstrated that
the "buzz" or discussions were caused byJustin's profile as opposed
to the reaction of administrators.16 5
The court also noted that while the student accessed the profile
from school, there was no evidence that the school was aware of this
when they punished him.1 66
F. Avoiding the Issue
A few courts have conveniently avoided the issue altogether, by
looking at Internet speech or other forms of off-campus speech
brought on campus through the Tinker and Fraser analyses, and find-
ing that, even if the expression were considered on-campus, the
school's restriction of the speech would violate the First Amendment.
Despite the greater leeway that school officials enjoy over student
speech in school, their actions in these cases would not have been
constitutional, because these examples of student expression did not
fall into the categories of less-protected speech.1 67
In Killion ex rel. Paul v. Franklin Regional School District,168
Zachariah Paul, a high school student, was suspended for a "Top Ten
List" he created ridiculing the school athletic director. While he com-
posed the list entirely on his own time, from his own computer, and
163 Id. at 592-93.
164 See id. at 599.
165 Id. at 600. But see J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07-cv-585, 2008 WL
4279517 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (holding, under similar circumstances, that suffi-
cient nexus existed).
166 Id. at 601.
167 Commentators have decried this practice as somehow using Tinker to deter-
mine the location of the speech, or as a threshold matter to see if the speech was on-
campus speech. See Brenton, supra note 82, at 1227 ("To employ the Tinker test to
answer the threshold question of when cyberspeech is student speech is to use the
wrong tool for the wrongjob."). On the contrary, courts do not use Tinker to deter-
mine the location of speech. They may, however, assume that Tinker applies for the
purposes of disposing of the issue without having to decide the location of the speech.
168 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
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distributed it to others via e-mail, another unknown student reformat-
ted the list, printed copies, and distributed them at school.' 69 The
school suspended Zachariah for ten days for "verbal/written abuse of
a staff member." 7 0 The court found that the "overwhelming weight
of authority has analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus)
in accordance with Tinker."'7 1 Zachariah's list had not created any
substantial disruption, nor could the school reasonably foresee the
threat of substantial disruption.17 2 The court found that even if it had
reached the issue of whether or not the speech was on campus, it did
not rise to a Tinker disruption and thus the suspension violated the
student's First Amendment rights. 7 3
In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District,174 school officials sus-
pended Brandon Beussink when they discovered that he had created
a website criticizing the school with crude and vulgar language and
inviting students to contact the school with their concerns and criti-
cisms. The student created the website on his home computer,
outside of school time; he claimed he never intended anyone from
school to view it.1"5 Unfortunately, a student did view the website
from a school computer and brought it to the attention of a
teacher. 76 The school then suspended the student for ten days.177
169 Id. at 444-49. The list read as follows:
10) The School Store doesn't sell twink[i]es.
9) He is constantly tripping over his own chins.
8) The girls at the 900 #'s keep hanging up on him.
7) For him, becoming Franklin's "Athletic Director" was considered "mov-
ing up in the world".
6) He has to use a pencil to type and make phone calls because his fingers
are unable to hit only one key at a time.
5) As stated in previous list, he's just not getting any.
4) He is no longer allowed in any "All You Can Eat" restaurants.
3) He has constant flashbacks of when he was in high school and the ath-
letes used to pick on him, instead of him picking on the athletes.
2) Because of his extensive gut factor, the "man" hasn't seen his own penis
in over a decade.
1) Even if it wasn't for his gut, it would still take a magnifying glass and
extensive searching to find it.
Id. at 448 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 Id. at 449.
171 Id. at 455.
172 Id. The court also considered and rejected the defense that the speech could
be prohibited as patently offensive under Fraser. See id. at 453-54.
173 Id. at 455.
174 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
175 Id. at 1177.
176 Id. at 1177-78. The student admitted that she did it in order to get Brandon
in trouble, in retaliation for an earlier disagreement. Id.
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Again, ignoring the on-campus/off-campus distinction, the court
found that the website did not cause a substantial disruption-only a
few other students viewed the website during the day before Brandon
removed it.178 The only disturbance resulted from the delivery of dis-
ciplinary notices to Brandon during the day.' 79 Thus, without having
to address the location of the speech, the court found that the suspen-
sion was unconstitutional, since the speech did not even amount to a
disruption under Tinker.
III. CREATING A TEST FOR ON-CAMPUS/OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
A test is needed to mark the boundaries of free speech protection
from school discipline over speech that originates off campus.s 0 Stu-
dents will benefit from a clear test so that they can order their lives
accordingly and be put on notice that certain less-protected forms of
speech, though originating off campus, could make them subject to
school discipline. Even more importantly, schools need guidance on
how far their control over disruptive student speech extends. Schools
need a test that is easy for administrators to apply and leaves them a
large measure of discretion to deal with disruptive speech in order to
maintain order and discipline in schools. Schools have an interest in
knowing the extent of their power, so they can respond quickly and
confidently to disciplinary problems, all while avoiding costly and
time-consuming lawsuits down the road.' 8" Such a test should con-
tinue to vindicate the interests that the Supreme Court has stated are
important in the freedom of speech context in schools. That is, the
law must permit schools to have "comprehensive authority ... to pre-
scribe and control conduct,"18 2 without making schools "enclaves of
totalitarianism." 183 The schools must be a place for "teaching stu-
177 Id. at 1179.
178 Id. at 1178-79.
179 Id. at 1179-80. Furthermore, the principal testified that his only reason for
issuing the suspension was his dislike of the content of the website. See id. at 1180.
180 Cf Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2004)
(noting legal commentators' calls for clarity).
181 See, e.g., Lisa Stiffler, Ex-Student Awarded Damages in His Free-Speech Lawsuit, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLICENCER, Feb. 21, 2001, at BI (reporting that student who sued after
school punished him for his website parodying an administrator awarded $62,000 in
settlement agreement).
182 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(emphasis added).
183 Id. at 511.
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dents the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,"1814 yet also
operate as the "marketplace of ideas."185
This Part first examines the various tests that commentators have
suggested. Then, it suggests a new test for determining when student
speech of off-campus origin has "reached campus" such that a school
can exercise its authority over the speech if it falls into the less-pro-
tected category. This optimal test requires that the speech (1) physi-
cally reach campus and (2) be intended by the speaker to reach
campus. That intent can be shown by either examining the subjective
intent of the speaker, or by looking at the medium of communication
the speaker used.
A. Other Tests
Critics and commentators have suggested many tests as to how
schools should be able to address off-campus speech. Tension exists
between schools' interest in maintaining order and students' interests
in free expression of ideas. Scholarship is quite divided between calls
to protect student speech even more against school intrusion, and
calls to give schools more power to punish speech, usually animated
by the concern over cyberbullying. 186 Tension also exists between the
benefits of having a clear rule for school administrators to live by and
having a flexible test for judges to apply as they see fit. Such suggested
tests range from the simple to the exotic. Some propose a dramatic
divergence from the current, somewhat muddied line of lower court
decisions, while others attempt to compile the decisions together to
extract a multifactor test. Most are concerned only with Internet
speech, which leaves unaddressed student speech cases that involve
underground newspapers or other methods of distribution.187 While
such tests are useful for addressing very specific aspects of the student
speech issue, they lack universal applicability.
184 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
185 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
186 Compare Todd D. Erb, Note, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to
Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 Amz. ST. L.J. 257, 271-87 (2008) (call-
ing for fewer overall protections for student speech), with Christi Cassel, Note, Keep
out of MySpace!: Protecting Students from Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49
Wm. & MARY L. REv. 643, 666-80 (2007) (advocating a test that gives student Internet
speech special protections). Another approach emphasizes the importance of pro-
tecting student free speech rights, because of the safety-valve effect of free speech,
allowing students to vent their frustrations without acting out in true violence. See
Calvert, supra note 13, at 282-85.
187 One test even limits itself to only MySpace-type websites. See Cassel, supra note
186, at 672-73.
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Importantly, almost every test suggested recognizes the impor-
tance of the state of mind of the student speaker. Beyond that com-
mon thread, the tests fall into three basic categories: intent-based,
nexus-based, and technology-based. 88
1. Intent-Based
While nearly all suggested tests depend on the intent of the stu-
dent speaker to some degree, some turn on that issue exclusively. For
example, Alexander Tuneski suggests a test that categorically places
Internet speech outside the realm of school authority altogether,
unless the student intended his speech to reach campus.189 The test
calls for a "a clear line [to] be drawn between on- and off-campus
speech in order to guard off-campus speech adequately."' 90 It is
framed in terms that suggest a hard-line stance to protect Internet
student speech from unconstitutional infringement,19 1 but at its heart,
it is a test that turns on the intent of the speaker. Under this test,
Tinker would not necessarily apply even to Internet speech that is dis-
ruptive to campus.192 If, however, the student directed his speech to
campus via the Internet, school administrators could discipline the
student under Tinker"9 1 The student might direct his speech towards
campus by emailing it to a school email address, by opening a
webpage of his creation in school, or by directing others to do so.' 9 4
This test seems reasonable and affords students a certain level of
protection for their off-campus speech. Other states of mind, such as
knowledge or reasonable foreseeability will not be enough to connect
the speech to campus. Neither will speech that reaches campus via a
third party, without the original student taking proactive steps to
direct it there. The test does not open up the entire realm of Internet
speech to school discipline, and yet ensures that the most malicious
speech-disruptive speech that students intentionally direct towards
school-is punishable.
188 However, as this Note explains below, each possible test considers the intent of
the speaker in some way.
189 Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student Internet
Speech, 89 VA. L. REv. 139, 177 (2003). Tuneski's primary concern seems to be the
malleability of the Tinker substantial disruption test. See id. at 170.
190 Id. at 159.
191 See id. ("Both policy and logic demand that internet speech be clearly classified
as off-campus speech and afforded the full protection of the First Amendment.").
192 See id. at 177.
193 See id. ("By taking this additional step, a speaker decides whether she wishes to
subject herself to the jurisdiction of school officials.").
194 See id. at 178.
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Of course, the difficulty for school administrators will be in deter-
mining whether or not the student intentionally directed the speech
to campus. Subjective intent can be difficult to determine.' 95
Tuneski's test relies, however, on outward signs to indicate the intent
of the speaker, such as sending an email to a school email account, or
the student accessing the website himself from school, signs which
could be rather apparent to school officials.
2. Nexus-Based
Several suggested tests use multifactor analyses to ensure that the
off-campus speech has enough of a connection to campus before
schools can punish it as less-protected speech. This methodology
seems intuitive and has been frequently applied by courts.196 While
each test suggests different factors to be considered, the common
thread that runs through most of them is the speaker's intent.
Though combined with many other factors, most tests suggest that the
intent of the speaker that his off-campus speech reach campus is
highly relevant to the analysis.
Tracy Adamovich suggests a test for off-campus speech that uses
the standard for government employee speech.19 7  Specifically,
Adamovich's test is designed to address the situation where off-cam-
pus student speech is brought onto campus by a third party, and to
determine whether or not a school can punish the student for that
speech. 98 Though not exactly the same, obviously, Adamovich con-
tends that there are enough similarities between students and govern-
ment employees-the need for government to maintain discipline
and the similarities between the teacher-student relationship and the
supervisor-employee relationship-for the test to be applicable.199 Of
course, as Adamovich points out, the test for employee speech is at its
heart a balancing test.200 Adamovich suggests that in the student con-
195 See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463,
526-27 (1992) (noting the difficulty of determining mental state).
196 See supra Part II.E.
197 See Adamovich, supra note 80, at 1102-06.
198 Id. at 1107-11. Thus, the test merges the location question and the disruption
question. That is, it proposes to be an "all in one" test, replacing Tinker for purposes
of off-campus speech.
199 Id. at 1103-04.
200 Id. at 1104-05; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.").
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text, this balancing should consider four factors: "(1) the intent, if
any, for the speech to reach campus; (2) the number of listeners; (3)
the nexus between the student speech and school operations; (4) the
level of disruption on the school's operations caused by the
speech."201 When the number of listeners is greater, the connection
to campus is stronger. The "nexus" factor looks at the relevance of
the off-campus speech to the potential disruption on campus, the sub-
ject of the speech, and whether or not school is in session. 202 The last
factor, the level of disruption, simply restates the Tinker standard. 203
Thus, instead of being another factor to balance against the others,
this last element appears to be a strict requirement of the test.
Similarly, Kyle Brenton makes another analogy, comparing the
off-campus speech issue to the issue of personal jurisdiction. 204 This
analogy seems the most intuitive and is the most responsive to the
heart of the matter-that is, how far does school authority extend?
Brenton suggests that just as states can exercise personal jurisdiction
over noncitizens who show purposeful availment of the rights and
privileges of the state, 205 in the school context, Brenton suggests that a
school could show purposeful availment if a student accessed his own
website while on campus, showed it to others, and did not access it for
school purposes. 206 Additionally, just as a state can exercise personal
jurisdiction over an individual when there are minimum contacts,
shown by intentional conduct by the defendant that harms the plain-
tiff in the forum state, 207 a school could do the same if the student
targeted the speech towards school, with the intent that it be accessed
at school, and the intent that the speech cause harm. 20s Lastly, just as
courts still make one final check for fundamental unfairness in the
personal jurisdiction realm, even if other criteria have been satis-
201 Adamovich, supra note 80, at 1108.
202 See id. at 1110.
203 See id. at 1111 (noting that there must be either actual, substantial, or the rea-
sonable foreseeability of disruption, per Tinker).
204 See Brenton, supra note 82, at 1230-31 ("[C]ourts have at their disposal a
robust jurisprudential mechanism that they may readily adapt to evaluate a school's
claim of authority over a student's off-campus cyberspeech: the rules of personal
jurisdiction.").
205 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
206 Brenton, supra note 82, at 1235; cf J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d
847, 870 (Pa. 2002) (Zappala, J., concurring) ("[T]he fact that a web site is merely
accessed at school by its originator is an insufficient basis [to consider the speech on-
campus]." (emphasis omitted)).
207 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984).
208 Brenton, supra note 82, at 1236.
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fied,209 in the school context, Brenton suggests that courts would do
the same, striking a balance between "the interest of the student in
the right of unrestrained expression, and the interests of the school in
maintaining an orderly educational environment."21 0
Unlike other multifactor tests, Renee Servance does not take into
account the intent of the speaker.2 11 Like most others seeking to
address cyberbullying, she advocates more deference to schools to
address the problem. 2 12 She does so, however, by removing any sort
of geographic requirement, and by adding a requirement of negative
personal impact on top of the Tinker standard. In her three-step test,
in order to punish student speech that originates off campus, a school
must show that the speech (1) has a sufficient "nexus" in connection
with the school campus, usually satisfied if both speaker and victim are
members of the same school community; (2) had an actual or foresee-
able negative impact on the target of the speech, much like that of
traditional bullying; and (3) caused an actual negative impact on the
school's ability to educate students or maintain authority over the
classroom. 213 Thus, there is no requirement that the speaker intend
for his speech to reach campus, nor that the speech actually reach
campus. Servance explains that "off-campus status [is] a somewhat
false barrier to school authority."21 4 Because, "[u]nlike traditional
forms.of speech, Internet content is not limited by geography," the
test does not require that the speech actually be present on cam-
pus. 215 Servance does not deny that when students are off campus,
their free speech protections are normally at their "zenith."2 16
Rather, her point is that the narrow category of Internet speech is not
geographically locatable, and thus, courts should not place any sort of
on-campus or off-campus connection requirement, giving schools the
209 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
210 Brenton, supra note 82, at 1240. When speech is on the Internet, this fairness
factor would shift the balance of interests strongly in favor of the student. See id.
211 See Renee L. Servance, Note, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 1213, 1238-43.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1239.
214 Id. at 1237.
215 Id. at 1235; see also Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering with Student Free
Speech: The Internet and the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 181-84 (2001)
(urging that a new understanding of the Internet replace the Court's current defini-
tion). But see Tuneski, supra note 189, at 163-65 (arguing that because the speech on
the Internet is not geographically locatable, schools should not have authority over
any of it).
216 Servance, supra note 211, at 1234.
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ability to address the impact of the speech.217 Thus, she suggests,
courts should depart both from the Tinker line of student speech
cases, and the muddied line of lower court cases dealing with off-cam-
pus speech, in order to specifically address cyberbullying.
These multifactor tests have their advantages and disadvantages.
One advantage is that courts are already applying similar balancing
tests, albeit on an ad hoc basis. 218 Most look at a variety of factors to
determine the strength of the connection to campus before they
regard the expression as school speech. Adamovich and Brenton
both draw upon tests familiar to courts in order to create a new test.
Brenton's seems more appropriate because he derives it from a test
for jurisdiction, which is essentially the issue that courts have consid-
ered in these cases. 219
However, there are numerous shortcomings of these tests. The
principal shortcoming is the unpredictability of multifactor balancing
tests.2 2 0 While most commentators strive to create a clear test, such
multifactor nexus and balancing tests will prove to be anything but
clear. Multifactor tests are "ubiquitous" though "imperfect" devices in
217 Id. at 1235-36. Servance cites JS. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847
(Pa. 2002), for support that there is no requirement for a geographic connection to
campus and that only the impact of the speech need be considered. See id. at 1242.
218 See supra Part I1.0.
219 See, e.g., Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 864 ("First, a threshold issue regarding the 'loca-
tion' of the speech must be resolved to determine if the unique concerns regarding
the school environment are even implicated."). The analogy is not perfect, however.
The reason for the requirement of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
explained, is the need to balance the interests at stake, including the defendant's
interest in being put on notice as to what jurisdiction he might be subject to, the
forum state's interest in deciding the dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining effi-
cient relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in an efficient system of adjudica-
tion, and the interest of all the states in a promoting certain social policies. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). While student speech
involves interests of the student and the school, it typically does not implicate compet-
ing interests between different jurisdictions. Thus, the situation is not the same as
having two states competing to protect their citizens' interests, as in personal
jurisdiction.
220 One frequently noted problem with multifactor tests is that the human mind
tends instinctively to rely on no more than a few of the factors, no matter how many
factors are available. See Barton Bebee, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1601-02 (2006). Also, when a mul-
tifactor test is presented, the mind ceases to gather information relevant to the other
factors once enough has been gathered with regard to the most important factors to
make them dispositive. Judges also tend to "stampede" the remaining factors. That
is, once they have decided a dispositive factor, the other factors tend to fall in line
with the same result. See id. at 1614-15.
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jurisprudence. 221 The tests must give guidance not only to courts, but
also to schools and students so they can order their conduct accord-
ingly.2 2 2 Even Brenton's personal jurisdiction analogy becomes mud-
died because of his introduction of a balancing test for unfairness on
top of the minimum contacts analysis.223 Additionally, though mul-
tifactor tests purportedly give guidance to judges, they can also open
the door to broad judicial discretion.224
Furthermore, with some of the tests, it is difficult to imagine an
example of student speech that would end up being substantially dis-
ruptive, or reasonably foreseeable to be substantially disruptive, that
could not also satisfy the other factors. For example, looking at
Adamovich's test, what truly substantially disruptive student speech
would not also meet the requirements of a large enough audience
and a close enough connection between the target of the speech-if
any-and the speaker? It seems that most speech that could actually
be substantially disruptive, is so because it reaches a large audience at
the school and has relevance to that audience. Neither is it clear what
work those factors are actually doing.225 If student speech was sub-
stantially disruptive, and yet only reached a small audience of students
that the student speaker did not have any close connection to, is that
speech really less worthy of deference to school authority than any
other disruptive speech? Should a clever student who devises a way to
direct his speech towards campus yet only reaches a small audience
but still causes a substantial disruption, really be rewarded by exempt-
ing him from school discipline?
Additionally, these tests do not always claim to be able to address
other student speech situations, such as those presented by Fraser,
Hazelwood, or Morse. For example, Adamovich's test merges with the
Tinker substantial disruption test. The additional factors-the size of
the audience and the connection to the audience-might have some
similarity to the goals of preventing substantial disruption, but they
221 Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 41 (2007).
222 Cf id. ("[M]ultifactor or balancing tests may be indeterminate, and applying
or weighing some of the factors within the test may require intuition.").
223 See supra, notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
224 See Carlos Gonzales, Trumps, Inversions, Balancing, Presumptions, Institution
Prompting, and Interpretive Canons: New Ways for Adjudicating Conflicts Between Legal
Norms, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 233, 286 (2005).
225 Looking at the cases that found a substantial disruption, they would likely all
still find a connection to campus under one of the balancing tests. Furthermore, not
one case found that the speech constituted a substantial disruption, and yet did not
have a sufficient connection to campus, thus making the speech off-limits from school
authority.
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are not as relevant if the issue is speech that is plainly offensive or
promotes illegal drug use. In a similar fashion, Servance's impact
analysis test is really addressed towards cyberbullying, which leaves
unaddressed substantially disruptive speech that does not constitute
cyberbullying, as well as the other categories of less-protected student
speech.
3. Technology-Based Tests
One commentator suggests that the test should turn on the
intent of the speaker, as indicated by the medium of communication
the student speaker used.2 2 6 Kenneth Pike explains that certain
modes of communication create "active telepresence," such as email,
text messaging, and phone calls. 227 Others are passive in nature, such
as web pages, blogs, and MySpace.228 However, most forms of passive
telepresence can be used in an active way, such as blogs, where the
posting is of special interest to a particular audience.229 These types
of communication would require an analysis of the creator's intent to
communicate the website with an audience on campus. 230 Relevant
factors would include whether or not the student encouraged others
to access the website at school, or whether or not the website advo-
cates some sort of action at school.231 However, a website that simply
includes the school name or discussion of school events or people,
absent an intent that the website be viewed at school, would be pas-
sive.23 2 Pike's test could easily be applied to nonelectronic means of
communication. For example, off-campus distribution of an under-
ground newspaper would likely be "passive" communication, while
mailing a letter to a teacher or administrator would be "active."
The shortcoming of this test is that it is unwilling to look at the
subjective intent of a speaker to determine if an otherwise passive
mode of communication was used intentionally to reach campus. For
example, if a student posts something on his personal blog, knowing
full well that other students will be accessing that blog in a computer
lab during school hours, Pike's test would be unable to connect that
speech to campus.233
226 See Pike, supra note 5, at 1002.
227 Id. at 1002-04.
228 Id. at 1004.
229 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 2007).
230 Pike, supra note 5, at 1004.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 As this Note suggests this problem is remedied by combining Tuneski's intent
test with Pike's passive/active telepresence test. See infra Part III.B.
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B. Suggesting a Pure Intent and Location Test
Off-campus speech should be considered on-campus when the
student intends that the speech reach the school and the speech actu-
ally does reach school. The student's intent to reach campus could be
indicated by the type of communication technology employed or by
some overt act of the student. Merely requiring that the student "rea-
sonably foresee" that speech reach school is not enough. Also, a mul-
tifactor nexus will lead to inconsistent outcomes, an undesirable result
as commentators already decry the "total disarray" of lower courts
regarding the issue now. Once it has been established that student
speech, whether it is written or electronic, has reached campus, and
that the speaker intended it to reach campus, then the school would
be able to restrict the speech if it also fell into a less-protected
category.
Intent that the speech reach campus could be evidenced by a stu-
dent who "tell[s] others to view [a web]site from school" or "dis-
tribut[es] newspaper as students enter school." 234 If the student views
the website himself at school and shows it to others, that would be the
equivalent to the student bringing the speech to school himself, which
would automatically establish a connection to school. In addition,
some forms of electronic communication, such as email or instant
messaging, inherently imply intent to communicate to a certain recipi-
ent.23 5 Thus, this proposed test would also incorporate Pike's test,
finding some mediums of communication to be active and others pas-
sive. If the medium is a passive form of communication, it could still
be shown that the student intended the speech to reach school, if
there was additional evidence to indicate this.2 36
The test follows the basic framework of what courts are already
doing. Thus, it will not represent a dramatic departure from the vari-
ous cases in scattered jurisdictions addressing the issue. Most courts
engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine if the speech is connected
to campus; (2) determine if the speech is less protected. Most courts
already consider the state of mind of the student speaker regarding
the speech in order to determine the strength of the connection to
234 Tuneski, supra note 189, at 178.
235 See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
236 For example, in Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa.
2007), the student created a website, a normally passive form of telepresence. How-
ever, the student also showed the website to others. Id. at 591-93. Because he took
affirmative steps to make the website available to others while at school, his actions
indicate an intent to reach school campus, essentially using the medium of the web-
site as a form of active telepresence.
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campus. Sometimes the analysis turns on this factor alone, while at
the very least, it is a significant factor among several others.
This test retains the basic framework for evaluating on-campus/
off-campus speech, while still being able to address all types of speech,
electronic and nonelectronic, disruptive, plainly offensive, or other-
wise. It avoids creating a new and complicated test, or generating a
specific test only to be applied to Internet speech, or worse, only to
MySpace pages.237
This test adequately addresses the real question that courts strug-
gle with. That is, when does off-campus speech become on-campus
speech, subject to school discipline as less-protected speech? It is a
question of location.238 While cyberbullying is certainly a concern for
society, the real issue over which courts are in "total disarray" is the
extent of school authority over speech. This test clarifies that confu-
sion, without disturbing the relatively clear categories of less-protected
student speech in the Tinker line of cases.239
As previously noted, courts and commentators alike recognize
the importance of the state of mind of the speaker to this issue.
Courts from very different jurisdictions instinctively cling to that issue
in their analyses.240 While schools should be able to hold students
accountable for their speech, students also need to be put on suffi-
cient notice that their speech could fall within the realm of school
discipline. The intent requirement accomplishes this. 241
The test protects those whose speech is brought to campus, with-
out their knowledge, by a third party. In the case of Porter, for exam-
ple, Adam Porter, the original creator of the drawing, could not be
subject to discipline over the drawing under a Tinker standard,
because his brother inadvertently brought the drawing to campus. 242
Similarly, in Killion, the student would not be punished for creating
the Top Ten list that another student later printed out and brought to
237 See Cassel, supra note 186, at 672.
238 SeeJ.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).
239 Despite some criticisms of the Tinker test, see Tuneski, supra note 189, at 170, it
is remarkable that it has stood for so long with little modification. It remained for
twenty years before Fraser was decided, and it has continued to remain the widely
accepted standard to this day. But see Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority
and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REv. 623, 646 (2002) ("As one might expect from
the foregoing discussion, Tinker and its progeny have left the lower courts in a state of
confusion.").
240 See supra Part III.
241 See Tuneski, supra note 189, at 177.
242 See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
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campus.2 4 3 Again, the chilling effect on speech would be great if stu-
dents could be held accountable for their speech if another party sim-
ply unilaterally printed or copied his expression and brought it to
school. It would be akin to strict liability.
Courts are familiar with the intent requirement, and they have
required intent in other speech contexts in order to remove speech
from its normally protected status. Under Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 4 4 for
example, speech that incites imminent lawless action is unprotected
only if the speaker directs his speech towards producing the action. 245
Cohen v. California2 46 found that unless speech likely to provoke a vio-
lent reaction was directed at another, it could not be proscribed as
fighting words. 247 Thus, intent is no stranger to the realm of free
speech and it should be a required element for analyzing a connec-
tion between off-campus expression and the school environment.248
While subjective intent can be a hard thing for schools to deter-
mine, fortunately, overt actions will often evidence a student's intent
to direct off-campus speech to school. Additionally, when schools
investigate instances of disruptive off-campus expression, they fre-
quently have a multitude of witnesses to call upon, if the speech has
truly been widely disseminated. 2 4 9 They will be able to inform admin-
istrators as to the speaker's conduct and whether or not he showed it
to others or directed others to access it.
Reasonable foreseeability is simply not enough. Because the
Internet is so readily available in school and elsewhere, it is reasonably
foreseeable that once speech is on the Internet, it will end up any-
where there is a computer and a user interested in accessing it, includ-
ing at school. Allowing schools to punish speech that merely reaches
school, through a medium that essentially exists everywhere, would
243 See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text. Tuneski would, however, have
the person who brought the list to school able to be punished, just the same as any-
one else who brought disruptive outside speech into the classroom. See Tuneski,
supra note 189, at 164 n.107.
244 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
245 Id. at 447-48.
246 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
247 Id. at 20.
248 See also Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir.
2002) ("Requiring less than an intent to communicate the purported threat would
run afoul of the notion that an individual's most protected right is to be free from
governmental interference in the sanctity of his home and in the sanctity of his own
personal thoughts.").
249 See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (W.D. Pa.
2007) (noting that the principal was able to question numerous students about an
offensive website another student created).
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result in a strong chilling effect on student speech outside of
school. 2 50 Given the increasing use of Internet in schools, and the
increasing expansion of electronic communication, this problem will
only continue to grow. Over time, it will become reasonably foresee-
able that more and more speech would reach school campus, result-
ing in ever-diminishing protections for off-campus student expression.
As one court has noted:
We acknowledge that the line between on-campus and off-campus
speech is blurred with increased use of the Internet and the ability
of students to access the Internet at school, on their own personal
computers, school computers and even cellular telephones. As tech-
nology allows such access, it requires school administrators to be
more concerned about speech created off campus-which almost
inevitably leaks onto campus-than they would have been in years
past.25 1
Furthermore, the level of reasonable foreseeability could depend
on the amount of filtering that schools implement over Internet
access. That is, the more restrictions and filters the school puts on
Internet access, the less foreseeable it is that a particular website will
reach campus. This puts control of the extent of their own authority
in the hands of schools. The intent test prevents all these problems by
requiring something more than merely presence on the Internet.
The test applies equally well to electronic and nonelectronic
means of communication. For example, the analysis would be the
same for an underground student newspaper. Distribution of the
newspaper after school, off of school grounds does not necessarily
indicate intent for the speech to reach school, while distribution
before school, near campus, would probably tend to indicate intent.
By requiring presence of the speech on campus and intent of the
speaker to reach campus, the test will continue to be relevant even as
technologies change. Of course, since certain forms of communica-
tion can automatically indicate the intent of a speaker to reach cam-
pus, 2 52 courts will still have to be aware of what mediums of
communication constitute "active telepresence" and which ones are
"passive." As technologies develop, however, courts can build up pre-
250 See also Calvert, supra note 13, at 282-85 (urging schools to give students lee-
way to vent frustration via the Internet so as to avoid violence in schools).
251 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07-cv-585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *7 n.5
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
252 See supra text accompanying note 235.
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cedent and knowledge about how to categorize different mediums of
communication. 253
The test excels at simplicity of application for schools. Schools
face the difficult task of maintaining order and preserving the educa-
tional environment without infringing on student rights. 254 The test
that they should apply to walk that fine line should favor the school
over judicial flexibility. Schools have to make quick disciplinary deci-
sions through the school day, and do not have the benefit of examin-
ing all the facts in a judicial proceeding, after the threat of disruption
has ceased. Courts have already recognized that schools are unique
environments where students do not enjoy the same rights as
adults.255 While courts have also remarked that the extent of defer-
ence extended to schools depends on their willingness not to overstep
their bounds of authority,256 this intent-based test does not ask for any
additional deference or an overreaching of authority. It merely asks
that courts establish clear boundaries within which schools are able to
exercise their authority. Unlike other tests, 25 7 it does not attempt to
redefine the categories of less-protected speech or reduce the overall
protection of student speech.
A simple test like this is far more desirable than a complex mul-
tifactor test. It will lead to more consistent outcomes in courts.258
Also, when courts have applied multifactor tests, they have done so
without schools having the benefit of knowing in advance what factors
would be relevant to the analysis. Making the requirements clear-
that the speech must reach campus and that the student must have
intended it to do so-allows schools to know ahead of time to what
standard the courts will hold them.
Perhaps most importantly, this test adequately vindicates the con-
cerns that the Supreme Court has identified in other student speech
253 It is well known that courts tend to be not as aware of technology as young
people. See Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, J.). Nevertheless, some judges are known as extremely tech-savvy-or even
electronic discovery "rock stars." SeeJason Krause, Rockin' Out the E-Law, 94 A.B.A. J.
48 (2008) (noting specific judges for their technological expertise).
254 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
255 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007).
256 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1979).
257 See, e.g., Sandy S. Li, The Need for a New, Unipm Standard: The Continued Threat
to Internet Related Student Speech, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 65, 87 (2006) (calling for a sepa-
rate standard for student Internet speech); Erb, supra note 186, at 284 (calling for less
overall protection for student speech).
258 Though multifactor tests can "nudge[] judges toward more deliberative
processes," Guthrie et al., supra note 221, at 41, a clear intent requirement will be
much more effective at focusing judges on the proper deliberative process.
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cases. It protects the school environment, and yet allows the school to
inculcate values of civility in its students. 2 5 9 It allows schools to main-
tain an orderly environment for learning and discipline 26 0 when
speech is actually present on campus, and thus, presents the greatest
possibility for disruption of the school day. It permits schools to pun-
ish the most egregious offenders, those who intentionally disrupt the
school environment by directing their speech to school, including
those who bring the speech to school themselves, or those that
encourage others to access the speech at school.
Just like the Supreme Court student speech cases, this test repre-
sents a compromise. It fairly balances the interests in protecting stu-
dent expression and allowing schools to protect against disruption in
the school environment. It is a simple test, familiar to courts, which
will be easy to apply. It is a universal test that avoids carving out
exceptions for electronic speech, a medium that can change dramati-
cally in a short period of time.
CONCLUSION
Someday, the occasion may arise for the Supreme Court to
address the extent of school authority over student speech of off-cam-
pus origin. Tinker and other cases, even Morse, have left that issue
open. While lower courts have exhibited some inconsistency in han-
dling these cases, for the most part, they have followed the same basic
framework: (1) the speech must have some connection to campus; (2)
it must fall under Tinker or another less-protected category of speech,
or be unprotected speech. Once those requirements are met, the
school can properly proscribe student speech.
In place of tests requiring "knowledge," "reasonable foreseeabil-
ity," or a nexus connecting the off-campus speaker, the speech, and
the school campus, courts should adopt an intent test. The test will
provide clear guidelines for students, schools, and courts. It will allow
schools to discipline the most egregiously disruptive speech, speech a
student intentionally directs towards campus. Other tests introduce
complicated, unpredictable multifactor or balancing tests. The intent
test is simple, yet it gives schools the authority to address the most
disruptive speech.
As the Internet continues to alter and expand the ways in which
students communicate with each other, it becomes more and more
likely that speech that originates off campus can come into immediate
259 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
260 See id. at 685; Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
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contact with the on-campus environment. Addressing this issue with
an intent test will help clarify the extent of students' free speech
rights, even as technology continues to change. It strikes a balance
between students' freedom of speech, the unique characteristics of
the school environment, and ever-changing technologies.
